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Chief of Base, Frankfurt
Chief of Station, Germany

REF-9548

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29 OCT 1959

Chief, SR

REDWOOD/ARHIDEON
Project ARHIDEON and ARHIDEON-1 Internal Sources

As Stated in Paragraphs 5 and 7 Below

- A. REF-28017
- B. DIR 49387

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Prior to specific comments on the reference A ARHIDEON-5 case, we would like to bring you up to date on recent developments which have a direct bearing on the handling of ARHIDEON-5 and other ARHIDEON-1 internal reporting sources. As you are probably already aware, [] has been reassigned without replacement which means his former duties have been absorbed by the remaining ARHIDEON desk officer, []. Coincidental with the foregoing, the handling responsibility for the ARHIDEON-601 case has been transferred from the KUCARE section to the KURBE section in the Branch. Close coordination on all incoming and outgoing traffic on ARHIDEON-601 is maintained between the sections. This arrangement has worked out very well to date and we see no reason why it should not continue.

2. No useful purposes would be served to review the past differences which arose over the appropriate internal KUBARK handling of ARHIDEON-1 internal sources other than to state the solution agreed upon, i.e., the preparation of a KURBE annex to cover ARHIDEON-1 sources like ARHIDEON-601 and such similar new ARHIDEON-1 recruits, was more realistic and practical than including them under Project ARHIDEON.

3. In theory, Headquarters still subscribes to the KURBE annex principle, but in view of the recent adverse operational developments in the ARHIDEON-601 case, the only active ARHIDEON-1 internal asset which would be covered by such an annex, the consensus of Headquarters opinion is there is no need to seek final staff approval on the proposed KURBE annex when from the practical standpoint there is no ARHIDEON-1 agent case-load. It is agreed, however, that if and when ARHIDEON-1 succeeds in building a new agent case-load, the handling of such new assets should be in accordance with the provisions of a KURBE annex to Project ARHIDEON. In the meantime, it is felt that the parent ARHIDEON Project Outline contains the necessary provisions to permit the handling of the ARHIDEON-601 case to its finality and contains sufficient authority for the appropriate handling of any newly developed ARHIDEON-1 sources.

4. While the ad hoc vivendi on the handling of ARHIDEON-1 internal sources was being reached, Project ARHIDEON expired. A review of the situation in ARHIDEON indicated that agent losses had reduced the ARHIDEON agent case-load down to ARHIDEON-5, a non-productive source under HIS control. The probable disposition of this case is that it will be dropped or turned over to ARHIDEON-1 to run with KUBARK assuming a monitor role. Under these circumstances, it was decided that the appropriate administrative action on the expired ARHIDEON Project was to request its termination. This was done and final approval should be forthcoming shortly. In summary, the remnants of all ARHIDEON-1 internal assets will be handled within the framework of Project ARHIDEON until such time as new ARHIDEON-1 assets are developed. When this comes to pass, a KURBE annex covering these new assets will be prepared and submitted for approval. We believe the foregoing administrative actions basically correspond to FGB views and desires on the internal KUBARK handling of ARHIDEON-1 reporting sources.

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5. As pertains to the ASHUR-5 case, we agree that the case should be dropped if we cannot elucidate the intent of the RIS into making this case more active by inducing them to believe that they can gain something more important from us by answering some of our requirements. It is with this thought in mind that Headquarters has suggested to issue the "comprehended" cache to ASHUR-5. We agree there is no need to give detailed cache instructions in the next letter to ASHUR-5. The mere mention of a cache with money should arouse the interest of the RIS. Since the RIS is not sure that we know the cache we intend to issue to ASHUR-5 has fallen into their hands, they can logically conclude the cache for ASHUR-5 is one they are not sure of. Also, the mention of a cache will bring internal "security" organs into the act who may well insist that the RIS case officer play the case along by answering some of our requirements until they learn the location of the cache. The play of arousing RIS interest will work till they find out the cache we intend to give to ASHUR-5 is one already under their control. This fact may well cause the RIS to write off the case themselves as they did in the ASHUR-6 case. However, till they receive the specific cache instructions, they may answer some of our requirements. We therefore suggest that ASHUR-5 be asked again to obtain the answers to the questions on the airfield himself or if he cannot do it himself, have it done through his friend.

6. The KIRINE evaluation of the information supplied by ASHUR-5 on his alleged new passport is as follows:

"1. The documentation furnished by ASHUR-5 can be divided into two parts: a) the information recently furnished and b) information furnished in 1952 and 1953.

"a. 1) The serial number of the new PASSPORT (XV-OK No. 997139) reported by ASHUR-5 to have been issued to him in Kiev in September 1957 is evaluated as: 2 'probably true.' (The issue date of September 1957 is assumed since the source reported the PASSPORT to be valid until 23 September 1967 making it a ten year PASSPORT.)

"2) The issuance of a 1954 GERMAN PASSPORT in 1957 is evaluated as: 2 'probably true,' based on examples from other areas.

"3) It is assumed that the source meant that the PASSPORT was in Ukrainian and Russian languages. A PASSPORT in the Ukrainian language alone is improbable.

"b. 1) The source reported in 1952 and 1953 that he obtained his illegal PASSPORT from a PASSPORTER through several other individuals for 6,000 rubles. If the source obtained his PASSPORT in the manner reported it is likely that the PASSPORTER intercepted the issuance of the PASSPORT and then covered-up the illegality of the action. This being the case, any back check by the militia would fail to uncover the fraud. It is therefore possible that the source could obtain a new PASSPORT as reported.

"2) The source's previous PASSPORT issued in July 1952 had expired by almost nine months before he was issued his current PASSPORT, in September 1957. The current internal PASSPORT regulations in the Soviet Union state that persons with expired PASSPORTS are subject to fines up to 100 rubles, particularly in instances where negligence on the part of the individual is evident. The stringency in reference to the regulations varies from locale to locale and the enforcement practices in Kiev in 1957 are not known. Since the source did not mention when he applied for his new PASSPORT, no comment can be made on the issuing of a new PASSPORT on the basis of an expired PASSPORT. If source applied for a new PASSPORT prior to the expiration of the old one or if he applied after the expiration date but not due to his negligence he would not be subject to a fine."

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With reference to section b. 1) of the analysis above, although it is not impossible that ASENHE-5 could have really obtained his passport as he reported, the fact that old ASENHE-514 was one of the individuals through whom ASENHE-5 obtained his old illegal passport, makes this possibility exceedingly thin.

7. In connection with the document information ASENHE-5 supplied in his last letter, KRIEGER has requested that the following document requirements be levied on ASENHE-5. The requirements are listed in order of priority in case some have to be eliminated in transmission.

"Questions on Call-in for Immense of Mobilization Assignments"

- "1. How were reservists called in to receive mobilization assignments?
- "2. To which page of the VOENKART KART was the certificate attached?
- "3. How many pages in the certificate?
- "4. What color is the certificate?
- "5. What entry is made in the VOENKART KART itself at the time the certificate is attached?
- "6. Are mobilization assignments given to all people assigned to the reserves? Immediately after call-up?
- "7. Transmit complete text of a KARTENKARTEN including printer's imprint and filled-in entries."

(28 October 1959)

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